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Recent increases in U.S. immigration enforcement at the local and state level may be
impacting remittance flows to developing countries by curtailing undocumented
immigration, restricting the cyclicality of migration flows and limiting employment
opportunities for the undocumented. We examine how the remitting patterns of
Mexican migrants in the United States are being impacted by two types of immigration
enforcement policies: police-based initiatives, such as 287(g) agreements and Secure
Communities, and employment-based programs, as is the case with employment
verification mandates. We find that increased enforcement reduces the share of migrants
sending money home. However, legal migrants remitting money home increase their
money outflows enough to offset any reductions in remittance payments from their
undocumented counterparts. As a result, the average dollar amount remitted per
Mexican migrant rises in the midst of increased uncertainty, safeguarding remittances
as one of the least volatile sources of income in the developing world.1. Introduction
The results from the past U.S. elections re-opened the path for a bipartisan compre-
hensive immigration reform. Yet, it quickly became apparent that any legislative suc-
cess will have to inevitably come at the expense of increased immigration enforcement.
In 2012, investments in immigration enforcement reached $18 billion –a figure that far
exceeded government spending on all the other major federal law enforcement agen-
cies combined (Meissner et al. 2013). However, to this date, there remain important
questions regarding the effectiveness and consequences of such investments at the fed-
eral, state and county levels.
In this paper, we focus on one particular lateral consequence of stepped up immigra-
tion enforcement –namely, how it may impact remittance flows. Remittances play an
important role in developing economies, including those in Latin America and the
Caribbean (Maldonado et al. 2010). Nowhere in that region are remittances larger than
in Mexico, where they represent the second source of income after oil and reached
$22.5 billion in 2012 (Fundación BBVA Bancomer 2013). Increased immigration en-
forcement could curtail these vital money flows in various ways. First, the growing
number of initiatives at the state and local level targeting the removal of undocu-
mented immigrants might reduce immigrant inflows. According to the Pew Hispanic
Center analysis of Mexican government data, the number of new immigrant arrivals
from Mexico fell from one million in 2006 to 404,000 in 2010, with recent net migra-
tion being close to zero (Passel and Cohn 2012). In line with those figures, the U.S.
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Second, increased immigration enforcement might further disrupt the historically cyc-
lical pattern of Mexican migration. Undocumented Mexican immigrants, who
accounted for approximately 60 percent of all illegal immigration in 2011 (Hoefer et al.
2012), are now more likely to stay in the U.S. for longer periods of time (Massey et al.
2002). This practice may weaken their ties with the home community, reinforce the de-
velopment of new ties and responsibilities in the United States, and ultimately their
lower remittance outflows (Hagan et al. 2008, Amuedo-Dorantes and Mazzolari 2010).
Third, the expanding use of employment verification (E-Verify) systems might reduce
Mexican migrants’ earnings –especially among the undocumented. They might be
forced to look for work in the informal sector, where pay discrimination and other
abuses are more dominant. Their lower earnings can, in turn, constrain their ability to
remit money home.
Despite the various channels through which increased immigration enforcement
might lower remittance flows, there is evidence of the exact opposite (World Bank
2006, Mahuteau et al. 2010, Varsanyi 2010, Vaira-Lucero et al. 2012, Piracha 2012,
Piracha and Zhu 2012, Gatina 2013). Specifically, fearing that their time in the country
may be cut short, migrants may save and remit more as an insurance mechanism
(Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006). Alternatively, legal migrants in a position to send
money home might increase their money outflows altruistically to help deported family
members or to make up for lower remittance payments from undocumented relatives.
In this study, we assess how increased immigration enforcement at the county and
state levels impacts Mexican migrants’ remitting patterns. At the state level, we focus
on the role played by E-Verify mandates and a few 287(g) agreements signed by states
with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). At the county level, we
consider 287(g) agreements –typically signed at the county level, as well as the Secure
Communities program. Due to the similarity in spirit of 287(g) agreements and the Se-
cure Communities program –designed as a continuation and replacement of the 287(g)
agreements, we combine those two measures into what we refer to as police-based ini-
tiatives, and explore their impact along with that of employment-based initiatives, such
as E-Verify mandates. We combine: (a) data on migrants’ remitting patterns from the
Mexican Migrant Project, and (b) data on the adoption date and geographic scope of
the aforementioned immigration enforcement measures. We then exploit the geo-
graphic and temporal variation in the adoption of tougher immigration enforcement
measures to gauge their impact on Mexican migrants’ remitting patterns.
Since, by definition, immigration enforcement targets undocumented immigrants, it
is natural to explore how this group’s remitting patterns are impacted by the aforemen-
tioned initiatives relative to those of their documented counterparts. Yet, it is worth
noting that more than 16 million undocumented immigrants in the United States res-
ide in mixed-status families (Passel and Taylor 2010, Debry 2012).1 Therefore, legal im-
migrants may also react to the various measures in place. For instance, they might face
growing financial responsibilities now that other household members are unable to
work and, consequently, become less likely to remit. Still, legal migrants in a position
to remit might increase their remittances for multiple reasons. Perhaps, they wish to
make up for their undocumented family members’ restricted ability to remit or, if some
of their family members were deported, they might need to increase their remittances
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some savings with the purpose of returning to Mexico in the future, perhaps to join
other family members, or they might want to ensure themselves against what appears
to be an increasingly hostile environment in the United States.
Furthering our understanding of how increased immigration enforcement at the
county and state level is impacting remittance flows is now more important than ever
for, at least, three reasons. First, remittance flows to Mexico are not only the second
source of revenue for the country after oil and the largest in Latin America and the
Caribbean, but have also been shown to have significant multiplier effect on economic
development and growth in that region (Taylor, Mora and Adams 2005, Adams and
Page 2005). Second, increased immigration enforcement may not only negatively impact
Mexico via reduced revenues, but also the United States by curtailing Mexican migra-
tion. After all, low-skilled immigration over the past decades allowed for a substantial
reduction in the price of locally-traded goods and services that are immigrant-intensive
in the United States (Cortés 2008).2 Third, any successful comprehensive immigration
reform proposal will most likely have to increase immigration enforcement and expand
E-Verify nationwide. Therefore, gaining a better understanding of how immigration en-
forcement and, more broadly, U.S. immigration policy impacts remittance flows is crit-
ically important when drafting viable economic development policies.2. Background on the various immigration enforcement programs
Immigration enforcement in the United States has built up to an extraordinary level
since the early 1990s, when the first border enforcement operations were implemented.
Since then, immigration enforcement has moved to a “consequence delivery system”
(CDS) intended to increase the costs of illegal immigration. A wide range of programs
and tactics have been adopted to that end by the federal, state and local governments.
Examining the impact of all those policies in a single manuscript is not feasible owing
to the distinct data challenges that the evaluation of each of those initiatives poses. We
thus focus on three policies. One of them is a state-level employment-based initiative –
namely, employment verification (E-Verify) mandates.3 The other two policies involve,
for the most part, local policing. Therefore, we refer to them as police-based initiatives
in what follows. They are the 287(g) agreements and Secure Communities. A brief re-
view of these programs is necessary in order to better understand and hypothesize
about their potential impacts.2.1. Employment verification systems
E-Verify is an internet-based, free program run by the United States government that
compares information from an employee’s employment eligibility verify form (I-9) to
data from U.S. government records. If the information matches, that employee is con-
sidered eligible to work in the United States. If there is a mismatch, E-Verify alerts the
employer and the employee is allowed to work while s/he resolves the problem. Nine-
teen states have enacted laws mandating the use of E-verify by firms with ties to state
public programs or by all firms as of 2012 with the objective to reduce employment of
unauthorized workers.4 Enrollment in E-Verify has jumped since 2005 in line with
many of these state mandates. According to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
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of their employees, with about 1,400 new businesses signing up each week.5 It is esti-
mated that E-Verify now screens more than 1 in 5 new hires with a disproportionate
share verified through larger firms (Rosenblum 2011).
Yet, as noted by Meissner et al. (2013), while many of the initial problems of E-Verify –
as is the case with the false negatives– have been greatly minimized, E-Verify still
faces important challenges, such as false positives due to the program’s limited ability
to detect identity fraud. Still, E-Verify mandates appear to be having an impact, with
immigrants often leaving the states where they are enacted (Bohn, Lofstrom and Raphael
2010; Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak 2012).2.2. 287(g) agreements
The 287(g) agreements date back to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which added Section 287(g) on the performance of
immigration officer functions by state officers to the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Section 287(g) allows a state and local law enforcement entity to enter into a partner-
ship with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in order to receive
delegated authority for immigration enforcement within their jurisdiction. Specifically,
it authorizes state and local police to screen people for immigration status, issue de-
tainers to hold them until ICE takes custody, and begin the process of their removal.
There are different types of 287(g) agreements and distinct implementation methods.6
Although they were introduced in 1996, the first 287(g) agreements between ICE and
state/local officers were not signed until 2002. At the end of 2012, ICE had signed 287
(g) agreements with 64 law enforcement agencies in 24 states (ICE 2012). The agree-
ments have been credited with identifying more than 304,678 potentially removable mi-
grants from January 2006 through the end of the 2011 (ICE 2012). However, despite
the emphasis placed by the Obama Administration in the identification and removal of
serious criminals, about half of the detainees had only committed misdemeanors or
traffic offenses (Rosenblum and Kandel 2011). Aside from ongoing debate about the ex-
tent to which 287(g) agreements have lowered the count of undocumented immigrants
at the county level (e.g. Parrado 2012, Watson 2013), a number of factors have contrib-
uted to the reduced funding for 287(g) agreements since 2012. The latter include in-
creased discontent about racial profiling,7 its high implementation cost, minimal
oversight and support from ICE, and accusations that the agreements are used as polit-
ical tools that interfere with protecting and serving communities (Immigration Policy
Center, April 2, 2010). As a result, 287(g) agreements have been progressively phased
out and replaced by Secure Communities.2.3. Secure communities
Secure Communities is a data-based program currently in place in practically all of the
nation’s jails and prisons. It establishes a fingerprinting check process that starts with a
local or state law enforcement agent taking the fingerprints of an arrested individual.
The process ends with ICE’s Law Enforcement Support Center generating a report that
may include a criminal-level classification.8 Overall, the purpose of the program is to
identify noncitizens who have committed serious crimes by using biometric
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partment of Homeland Security (DHS) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
databases.
The program quickly expanded since its first implementation in 2008, and it is
intended to eventually replace 287(g) agreements (ICE, Activated Jurisdictions). As
noted by Meissner et al. (2013), the total number of fingerprints submitted through the
Secure Communities program neared 7 million in 2011. The program has also issued a
growing number of detainers. Although individuals convicted of an aggravated felony
or multiple felonies are the main target of the program, arrestees with one or two mis-
demeanors have made up more than half of those ordered to be removed since 2010
(ICE, IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability Statistics 2, Kohli et al., 2011). Several communi-
ties initially opposed to the implementation of the program on the basis that the pro-
gram would undermine cooperation between the immigrant community and law
enforcement agents. However, the program is already functional in all states.
3. Theoretical framework and testable predictions
In this section, we use a simple model to derive some testable predictions regarding the
impact of tougher immigration enforcement on the remittance behavior of migrants.
With that purpose in mind, we follow Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo’s (2006) proposed
template for examining migrants’ remitting motives and model the inter-temporal re-
mitting decision of migrants using a two-period model with uncertainty in period 2. In
the first period, migrants arrive to the United States and decide whether to remit
money home for the traditional purposes identified in the literature –including altru-
ism, investment and self-insurance. In the second period, some of the counties/states
where migrants reside enact immigration enforcement measures that may adversely im-
pact their earnings.
Overall, migrants maximize the utility derived from their own consumption in pe-
riods 1 and 2, i.e. (c1, c2), as well as from the altruistic payments enjoyed by family
members (a) as specified in Equation (1):
U c1; c2; að Þ ¼ ω lnc1 þ 1−ωð Þ lna½  þ δ ω lnc2 þ 1−ωð Þ 1−Πð Þ lna½ ;
where : 0≤ω≤1; 0 < δ < 1; 0≤Π≤1:
ð1Þ
The weighing parameter: ω denotes the relative contributions to utility from the ownconsumption of goods and services, versus the altruistic payments made to their family
members. The parameter: δ denotes a discount factor showing the relative tastes for
current (c1) versus future consumption (c2). Finally, Π denotes the probability that the
counties/states where migrants reside implement tougher immigration enforcement.
We assume that, in the first period, migrants earn income YH with certainty. How-
ever, their income in period 2 is uncertain due to the possibility of stepped up immi-
gration enforcement. To simplify matters, we assume that with probability: (1–Π)
immigration enforcement is left unchanged, in which case migrants’ income remains
the same as in period 1 –namely: YH. However, with probability Π, the counties or
states where migrants reside adopt stricter immigration enforcement, in which case mi-
grants will earn a lower income (denoted by YL) due to their undocumented status or
discrimination.9
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First, we assume that the altruistic payments, a, only take place when migrants earn
YH. In addition to altruistic remittances, migrants may choose to set aside a sum z in
period 1 for self-insurance purposes or to earn a return to their investment equal to z
(1 + r) in period 2. Lastly, migrants may choose to remit to their family in the amount
of x in period 1 with the expectation that they will receive family-provided insurance;
that is, a payoff of g(x) in period 2 should their income drop to YL. We assume that: g ′
(x) > 0, g ″ (x) < 0 and g(x) < (YH − a − YL). In other words, the larger the family-provided
insurance premium paid today, x, the greater future coverage will be (i.e. g ′ (x) > 0), al-
though the increase will take place at a decreasing rate (i.e. g ″ (x) < 0). Furthermore,
family-provided insurance is not complete. One cannot insure against the total losses,
that is: g(x) < (YH − a − YL). We do not restrict who the insurer is as both insurance pay-
ments, x, and altruistic payments, a, can be made to the same families in the home
country. However, we assume that migrants are not expecting anything in return from
a; that is, these are purely altruistic payments.
Consumption in period 1 is constrained by migrants’ income, the amount sent for
family-provided insurance (x), their investments/self-insurance (z), and the level of al-
truistic payments they make to their families back home (a) as follows:
c1≤YH−x−z−a ð2Þ
In period 2, some of the counties/states where migrants reside adopt tougher immi-gration enforcement measures with probability Π. For those migrants, consumption be-
comes constrained by their lower income, YL; the payoff that family members make, g
(x); and the principal and return from their self-insurance, z(1 + r). Alternatively, con-
sumption might remain the same as in period 1 if immigration enforcement is not in-
creased. In that case, with probability (1–Π), consumption is constrained by their
income (YH) plus the principal and return to their savings: z(1 + r), minus their altruis-
tic remittances (a) as follows:
c2≤Π YL þ g xð Þ þ z 1þ rð Þð Þ þ 1−Πð Þ YH þ z 1þ rð Þ−að Þ ð3Þ
Migrants choose the amount of family-provided insurance, x, the level of self-insurance/investment or saving, z, and the level of altruistic payments, a, so as to
maximize the utility function described in (1) subject to the budget constraints in
Equations (2)-(3). We can derive the first-order conditions and, using the implicit func-
tion theorem, compute some comparative statics to assess how remittances change
with stricter immigration enforcement.10 As shown in the appendix: ∂x∂Π > 0,
∂z
∂Π > 0, but
the sign of ∂a∂Π is unclear. In other words, as the likelihood of exposure to tougher immi-
gration enforcement rises, migrants save more and either invest or remit more for self-
and family-provided insurance, possibly with the purpose of consumption smoothing.
However, it is unclear how remittances sent altruistically respond to increased enforce-
ment. They may increase if legal migrants raise their money outflows to make up for
the curtailed remitting ability of undocumented family members in the United States,
or to support deported family members back home. Alternatively, remittances sent for
altruistic purposes may drop as the earnings of undocumented migrants are harshly im-
pacted and legal migrants become responsible for a greater share of their household
needs in the United States. As such, from a theoretical point of view, overall remittance
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shed some more light on the overall impact of tougher immigration enforcement on re-
mittance outflows.4. Data and descriptive statistics
We use data from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP). The MMP was initiated in
1982 to study the migration of Mexicans to the United States. Each year, the MMP ran-
domly samples households in communities located throughout Mexico. It collects de-
tailed social, demographic, and economic information on those households and their
members. Of interest to us is the data collected on household head migrants. Although
the MMP is a cross-sectional survey,11 it gathers retrospective information on house-
hold heads’ U.S. migration history and, in particular, on their last U.S. migration spell.
Specifically, it contains information on when those migrants last came to the United
States and where they resided. We also have information on their employment, earn-
ings and average monthly remittances during their last U.S. trip. After gathering data
from returning Mexican migrants in Mexico, interviewers travel to the U.S. destinations
of migrants from the sampled Mexican communities to administer the same survey to
those Mexican migrants who have permanently settled in the United States. The sur-
veys conducted in Mexico and those conducted in the United States are then combined
to generate a binational sample.12 Altogether, the MMP provides reasonably representa-
tive data on legal and undocumented Mexican immigrants on both sides of the U.S.-
Mexico border.
The release of the MMP we work with contains data on Mexican migrants inter-
viewed between 1982 and 2011 in one of 134 Mexican communities or in the most
common U.S. destinations of Mexican migrants from those communities. To maximize
our sample size, we use data on all Mexican migrants regardless of when they last came
to the United States and how long they stayed. In those instances in which migrants ar-
rived after the earliest adoption of any of the initiatives at hand, i.e. 2002, we instru-
ment for their U.S. residential choice using: (a) the U.S. location where they resided
during a migration spell prior to 2002, or (b) in the case of first-time migrants, the
most common U.S. destination of migrants from their home community in Mexico
prior to 2002. As such, our sample contains information on four groups of migrants:
(1) Mexican migrants who migrated to treated U.S. localities prior to their adoption of
tougher immigration enforcement,13 (2) Mexican migrants who migrated to control U.
S. localities prior to the adoption of stricter immigration measures by other U.S. local-
ities, (3) Mexican migrants who migrated to treated U.S. localities after their adoption
of harsher immigration enforcement methods, and (4) Mexican migrants who migrated
to control U.S. localities after the adoption of the policies being examined by other U.S.
localities.
For all migrants, the interviewer documents each migration experience and obtains
extensive information about the last (or ongoing) migration spell, including their legal
status and remitting practices. Table 1 provides summary statistics of key characteristics
of migrants in our sample. The vast majority of migrants in the MMP are men.14 At
the time of their last U.S. trip, they were, on average, 33 years old and 27 percent of
them were married. Typically, they had completed 5.6 years of schooling. About 29
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variables Obs. Mean S.D.
Male 6,713 0.952 0.215
Age 6,713 33.495 11.922
Married 6,713 0.268 0.443
Years of education completed 6,713 5.609 3.981
Spoke English well 6,713 0.287 0.452
Worked during the last U.S. migration spell 6,713 0.955 0.207
Monthly wage earned during the last U.S. migration spell 6,713 949.3 1442
Lived with relatives or community members during the last U.S. migration spell 6,713 0.693 0.461
Participated in sports or social organization during the last U.S. migration spell 6,713 0.138 0.345
Municipal population 6,713 995,508 213,643
Communal population 6,713 66,144 198,154
Year of last U.S. trip 6,713 1986 11.094
Duration of last U.S. migration spell (in years) 6,713 3.189 5.652
Undocumented 6,713 0.640 0.480
Remitted money home during last U.S. migration spell 6,713 0.662 0.473
Average monthly real remittances during last U.S. migration spell 4,444 332 804
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an average of $949/month.15 About 69 percent of migrants lived with relatives or coun-
trymen (paisanos), and 14 percent participated in sports and social organizations.
Table 1 also displays information on the size of their Mexican communities and muni-
cipalities. Additionally, we have information on the timing and duration of their last
trip, as well as on their legal status at the time. On average, Mexican migrants in our
sample last entered the United States in 1986. Yet, the standard deviation is 11 years,
thus indicating the presence of significantly earlier as well as later entries. The mean
duration of their last migration spell was 3 years and 64 percent of them were undocu-
mented during their last trip. Essential to our study is the information regarding their
remitting patterns during their last U.S. migration spell. On average, sixty-six percent
of migrants in our sample indicate remitting money home during their last trip to the
United States. Those remitting money home sent an average of $332/month.
In order to examine how increased immigration enforcement may impact the remit-
ting patterns of Mexican migrants, we gather information regarding the timing and
geographic scope of the various policies. For instance, data on the enactment of E-
Verify mandates by various states are collected from the National Conference of State
Legislatures (NCLS) website. Data on the implementation of 287(g) agreements and Se-
cure Communities at the state and county levels are gathered from the ICE’s 287(g)
Fact Sheet website,16 from Kostandini et al. (2012), and from the ICE’s Activated Juris-
dictions document, respectively. We use the information on the timing and geographic
scope of the abovementioned policies to merge it to the MMP data according to the
time and place where the migrant indicates heading to at the time of her/his last trip to
the United States. We then create policy dummies that take the value of 1 when the
migrant resided in a so-called treated U.S. locality (that is, a locality that implements
one of the measures being examined) during the time period when the policies were in
place; otherwise, they take the value of 0.17
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of increased immigration enforcement. As noted in the Introduction, we group 287(g)
agreements and Secure Communities under a category that we label police-based initia-
tives given the similarities between the two programs and the fact that Secure Commu-
nities was designed to replace the 287(g) agreements. Hence, we distinguish between
police-based programs (i.e. 287(g) and Secure Communities) and employment-based
initiatives, namely E-Verify mandates. To assess their impact on migrant remitting pat-
terns at a descriptive level, we compare the remitting likelihood and average dollar
amount sent home by remitters in treated and control U.S. localities during the pre-
and the post-treatment periods for the two sets of policies. Because the policies all ex-
panded geographically over time, we take the earliest adoption year as the reference for
distinguishing a pre- versus post-treatment period. Those years are 2002 for 287(g)
agreements and Secure Communities and 2006 for E-Verify mandates. Additionally,
given the overlap of some immigration enforcement measures (for instance, police-
based initiatives and E-Verify mandates were both in effect in the post-2002 period), we
restrict our samples to better identify the effect of each policy. For instance, when
examining the impact of police-based initiatives, we exclude from our sample migrants
residing in states mandating the use of E-Verify at some point in time. Similarly, when
evaluating the impact of employment-based initiatives, we exclude from our sample mi-
grants residing in U.S. localities adopting police-based enforcement measures. As such,Table 2 Differences-in-differences in the probability to remit and the dollar amount
remitted home
Geographic areas that Geographic areas that DD
Implemented these programs Never implemented these
programs
Panel A: Police-based initiatives (287(g) and secure communities)
Pre-2002 Post-2002 DT Pre-2002 Post-2002 DC (DT-DC)
Remitting likelihood 0.624 0.751 0.127*** 0.645 0.833 0.188*** −0.061*
(0.485) (0.433) (0.021) (0.479) (0.374) (0.034) (0.040)
N 4119 486 4605 994 156 1150 5755
$ amount remitted 324.877 291.895 −32.983** 286.678 361.4 74.723* −107.705**
(505.37) (314.294) (19.223) (255.798) (637.767) (56.701) (59.831)
N 2569 365 2934 641 130 771 3705
Panel B: Employment-based initiatives (E-Verify)
Pre-2006 Post-2006 DT Pre-2006 Post-2006 DC (DT-DC)
Remitting likelihood 0.808 0.742 −0.066 0.665 0.778 0.113** −0.178**
(0.395) (0.445) (0.083) (0.472) (0.420) (0.058) (0.101)
N 265 31 296 1096 54 1150 1446
$ amount remitted 347.620 178.184 −169.44*** 303.187 231.406 −71.781** −97.654**
(361.366) (130.653) (36.448) (356.273) (238.938) (38.791) (53.191)
N 214 23 237 729 42 771 1008
Samples: To avoid the overlap of the two types of policies being examined, the sample in Panel A excludes migrants from the
geographic areas that eventually adopt E-Verify, whereas the sample in Panel B excludes migrants from geographic areas that
ultimately adopt 287(g) or Secure Communities.
Note: Standard deviations and standard errors (for the difference and difference-in-difference estimates) in parentheses.
***, **, *denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels at the corresponding one-tail and two-tail tests. DT stands for the
difference in remitting patterns among migrants in treated localities –localities adopting the examined measures, whereas
DC represents differences in remitting patterns among migrants in control localities –localities that do not adopt any of
the policies.
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regression-based analysis that follows, especially when examining the impact of E-
Verify mandates given the widespread implementation of Secure Communities. Never-
theless, they are helpful in revealing some preliminary and potentially interesting
changes in migrants’ remitting practices.
Indeed, simple difference-in-difference regression estimates reveal that the two sets
of policies appear to significantly impact the remitting likelihood of Mexican migrants,
as well as their average monthly remittances. Specifically, according to the figures in
Panel A, police-based initiatives (such as 287(g) agreements and Secure Communities)
lower the remitting likelihood of Mexican immigrants by 6 percentage points and their
average monthly remittances by roughly $108 or 33 percent. Similarly, the figures in
Panel B reveal that employment-based measures (such as E-Verify) reduce the remit-
ting likelihood of Mexican migrants by 18 percentage points and the average dollar
amount remitted by $98/month or 30 percent. These impacts could be explained by
migrants’ constrained ability to remit money home due to employment restrictions or
discriminatory treatment that negatively impact their earnings’ potential. Alternatively,
other factors we are not yet accounting for, such as ongoing economic trends in the
home and host communities or migrants’ personal characteristics, could be responsible
for the estimated coefficients. In what follows, we address that limitation with a more
thorough analysis.5. Methodology
Our main objective is to measure how increased immigration enforcement, as captured
by the implementation of 287(g) agreements, the Secure Communities program and E-
Verify mandates, impacts the remitting behavior of Mexican migrants in the United
States. The latter can be characterized as a two-step process. Migrants first decide
whether to remit money home, as described by the following equation:
Likelihood of Remitting:
Dirt ¼ α1 þ Xirtβ1 þ Y irtγ1 þ ui  Y irtð Þϕ1 þ δr þ θt þ δr  t þ εirt ¼ 1 Dirt > 0
 
;
where : εirteN μ; σ2Ið Þ
ð4Þ
where Dirt* is the unobserved or latent dependent variable determining the discrete
outcome Dirt –namely the decision to remit. Therefore, Dirt is a dummy variable indica-
tive of whether the ith migrant residing in region r (county/state) at time t chooses to
remit money home. The function 1[∙] is called the indicator function. It takes the value
of one when the event in brackets is true and zero otherwise. The vector X includes a
variety of demographic and migration-related characteristics shown in Table 1 and
known to influence migrants’ remitting patterns –including their immigration status. In
addition, the vector X includes a series of fixed-effects for the communities where mi-
grants are from in Mexico, along with community of origin-specific time trends and
some time-varying information on the population of those communities at the time of
migrants’ last U.S. trip. The community fixed-effects address unobserved time-invariant
community characteristics crucial in shaping remittance flows, such as a historically
higher predominance of migration in that community. Additionally, controlling for
Amuedo-Dorantes and Puttitanun IZA Journal of Migration Page 11 of 262014, 3:6
http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/6community of origin-specific time trends and for the communities’ population at the
time of their last migration addresses time-varying characteristics that change with the
community size and that clearly impact remittance transfers, such as the availability of
financial and money transfer services, educational and employment opportunities.
Yrt is a vector of two policy dummies (the employment-based E-Verify mandates, and
the police-based initiatives of 287(g) and Secure Communities) indicative of whether re-
gion r (county or state, depending on the scope of the policy) adopted any of the mea-
sures in question at time t, that is, during the migrant’s last U.S. visit. For instance, Yrt
will equal 1 for E-Verify if the migrant resided in AZ after 2007; it will equal 0 if s/he
resided in AZ prior to that date or if s/he resided in CA –a state without an E-Verify
mandate.
As noted earlier, due to the predominance of mixed-immigration status households
in the United States (Passel and Taylor 2010, Debry 2012), the two sets of policies
under examination may not solely impact the remitting patterns of undocumented im-
migrants. Rather, they are likely to also affect the remitting patterns of relatives who
are legal immigrants. For instance, an undocumented husband adversely impacted by
the enactment of an E-Verify mandate might no longer be in a position to remit money
home. Lower earnings may result in a greater economic burden for other household
members who, even if they are legal, might feel more financially constrained and be-
come less likely to remit. As such, we cannot think of legal migrants as a good control
group. Nevertheless, it is still of interest to examine how stricter immigration enforce-
ment is impacting the remitting patterns of both legal and undocumented immigrants;
therefore, we include a set of interaction terms of the policy dummies with migrants’
immigration status, i.e. ui * Yrt, where: ui (included in X) equals 1 if they were undocu-
mented and 0 otherwise.
We also include a vector (δr) of regional fixed-effects indicative of the U.S. county in
which migrants report residing at during their last migration spell. It helps us address a
variety of aspects likely impacting migrants’ remitting patterns, such as geographic dif-
ferences in immigrant networks, the availability of various remitting options in the area
(e.g. money transfer firms, banks, etcetera) or a long-standing history of anti-immigrant
policy. Likewise, we include the vector θt, which contains time fixed-effects capturing
aggregate level shocks potentially impacting immigrant remitting patterns, as might
have been the case with the 2008-2009 recession.
A key identification assumption in the analysis described above is the absence of dif-
ferential pre-treatment trends in the remitting patterns of migrants residing in what we
have been labeling as treated versus control U.S. localities (see footnote no. 14). This as-
sumption is violated if the remitting patterns of migrants in the two types of U.S. local-
ities already differed prior to the enactment of the policies being examined. To address
that possibility, we include U.S. locality-specific time trends (δr * t) in our most
complete model specification. In addition to capturing any pre-existing diverging trends
in migrants’ remitting patterns across U.S. localities, these controls address political,
economic or social developments at the locality level possibly related to migrants’ re-
mitting patterns and the enactment of the policies at hand. Examples of such develop-
ments include changes in the economic infrastructure of the region (e.g. a localized
decline of specific industry sectors, such as construction), changes in the political pref-
erences of constituents or the proliferation of new immigrant settlements.
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money to send, as described by the following equation:
Remittance level:
RirtjDirt
  ¼ α2 þ Xirtβ2 þ Y irtγ2 þ ui  Y irtð Þϕ2 þ δr þ θt þ δr  t þ νirt;where : νirteN μ; σ2Ið Þ
ð5Þ
where Rirt represents the dollar amount sent home by those remitting. Therefore, the
vector Rirt is a continuous non-negative random variable bounded at zero.
The conventional approach to estimating the two-equation model described above is
a censored type model, such as the Tobit and its closely related variants –namely Tobit
I or Tobit II. These models estimate a log-likelihood function consisting of two parts:
(1) one that describes the decision to remit and utilizes all observations, and (2) a sec-
ond one that models the amount remitted conditional on the observations not being
censored. However, this approach has several drawbacks. First, the model relies on very
strict assumptions, which include: the linearity, homoscedasticity and normality of the
error term, for its validity. Otherwise, the usage of a Tobit model is highly inappropri-
ate as it yields inconsistent estimators. We tested the appropriateness of the Tobit
model in our case using the LM-statistic.18 A rejection of the null suggests that the
Tobit specification is unsuitable. Second, the model is restrictive in that it assumes that
the same mechanism explains the decision to remit and the dollar amount ultimately
remitted. This is an important modeling constraint that does not fit the reality. As an
example, tougher immigration enforcement policies might restrict migrants’ ability to
earn and save money and, as a result, fewer migrants might remit money home. How-
ever, those in a position to remit might increase the dollar amount sent home for insur-
ance purposes or to make up for lower remittance payments from undocumented
family members in the United States. Third, the model is only applicable when zero
values capture true censoring, which might not be the case here. The observed zeroes
may very well represent the amount the migrant chooses to remit.
An alternative approach is to estimate a two-part model, such as a Heckman or
double hurdle model. However, identification is likely to be a problem in those models.
After all, it is hard to think of a variable that would credibly impact the decision to re-
mit, but not the amount sent home. Hence, in order to avoid the imposition of non-
credible assumptions about the data or functional forms, we estimate the two equations
separately via simple ordinary least squares.19 Standard errors are clustered at the U.S.
county level –the finest geographic level at which immigration enforcement policies are
implemented (Bertrand et al. 2004).6. Results
Does increased border enforcement impact the remitting behavior of immigrants? And,
if so, does the impact differ with the migrant’s legal status? Also, what can we conclude
about the effect of police-based and employment-based immigration enforcement initia-
tives? Do both types of policies have similar impacts on migrant remittances? The
figures in Tables 3 and 4 address these questions by displaying the estimated impacts
that police-based measures, such as 287(g) agreements and Secure Communities, and
Table 3 Likelihood of remitting money home
Variables (1) (2) (3)






287(g) agreements & secure communities −0.260*** −0.298*** −0.260***
(0.098) (0.085) (0.088)
E-Verify mandates 0.355*** 0.021 0.022
(0.028) (0.034) (0.037)
Undocumented 0.112*** 0.051** 0.052***
(0.016) (0.020) (0.020)
Undocumented*287(g) & secure comm. 0.371*** 0.284*** 0.251***
(0.105) (0.090) (0.098)




Age at last U.S. trip 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003)
Age at last U.S. trip squared −9.71e-05*** −9.67e-05***
(3.24e-05) (3.18e-05)
Married during last U.S. trip 0.008 0.012
(0.038) (0.037)
Years of schooling −0.006*** −0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
Speaks english well 0.028 0.028
(0.027) (0.027)
Monthly earnings in the U.S. −2.91e-06 −2.33e-06
(4.68e-06) (4.75e-06)
Length of Last U.S. Trip −0.002*** −0.002***
(3.18e-04) (3.25e-04)
Length of last U.S. trip squared 4.12e-06*** 3.99e-06***
(1.11e-06) (1.17e-06)
Lived with relatives or community members 0.045* 0.041*
(0.032) (0.031)
Participated in sports or social organizations −0.078*** −0.073***
(0.029) (0.028)
Communal population −3.76e-08 −3.97e-08
(7.22e-08) (7.26e-08)
Municipal population 1.13e-07* 6.71e-08
(7.43e-08) (7.75e-08)
Observations 6,703 6,703 6,703
R-squared 0.020 0.183 0.194
Notes: All models include a constant term. In addition to the shown regressors, specification (2) contains fixed-effects for
the last year in the U.S. and community of origin in Mexico, as well as community of origin time trends. Finally, specification
(3) adds U.S. location-specific time trends to the regressors included in specification (2). Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the U.S. county level. ***, **, *denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels at the corresponding one-tail and
two-tail tests.
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Table 4 Log of dollar amount remitted
Variables (1) (2) (3)






287(g) agreements & secure communities 0.381 0.607** 0.724***
(0.302) (0.262) (0.256)
E-Verify mandates −0.260* 0.214 0.140
(0.200) (0.177) (0.238)
Undocumented −0.102 −0.026 −0.006
(0.122) (0.052) (0.050)
Undocumented*287(g) & secure comm. −0.231 −0.326* −0.347*
(0.317) (0.218) (0.224)




Age at last U.S. trip 0.006 0.007
(0.014) (0.014)
Age at last U.S. trip squared −1.22e-04 −1.39e-04
(1.71e-04) (1.69e-04)
Married during last U.S. trip 0.149* 0.139*
(0.107) (0.108)
Years of schooling 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.004)
Speaks english well −0.104** −0.103**
(0.048) (0.048)
Monthly earnings in the U.S. 2.68e-05 3.19e-05*
(2.22e-05) (2.1e-05)
Length of last U.S. trip 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Length of last U.S. trip squared 3.17e-06 4.24e-06*
(3.26e-06) (2.85e-06)
Lived with relatives or community members −0.003 −0.008
(0.074) (0.073)
Participated in sports or social organizations −0.146** −0.138*
(0.081) (0.080)
Communal population −2.49e-07 −2.06e-07
(2.24e-07) (2.43e-07)
Municipal population 1.25e-07 2.39e-07
(3.71e-07) (3.72e-07)
Observations 4,438 4,438 4,438
R-squared 0.004 0.242 0.268
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the dollar amount remitted in real terms. All models include a
constant term. In addition to the shown regressors, specification (2) contains fixed-effects for the last year in the U.S. and
community of origin in Mexico, as well as community of origin time trends. Finally, specification (3) adds U.S. location-
specific time trends to the regressors included in specification (2). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the U.
S. county level. ***, **, *denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels at the corresponding one-tail and two-tail tests.
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migrants in the United States and on the amount remitted by those choosing to do so.
Column (1) shows the results from estimating a baseline specification that only in-
cludes a constant term along with the policy and undocumented immigration status
dummies, plus their interaction terms. Column (2) expands our baseline specification
by adding the demographic and migration-related characteristics included in Table 1,
as well as fixed effects for the community of origin, U.S. county of residence and last
year in the United States. Additionally, the specification in column (2) contains com-
munity of origin-specific time trends. Finally, column (3) adds U.S. county-specific time
trends to account for the possibility that distinct trends in migrant remitting patterns
between treated and control U.S. localities already in place prior to the adoption of the
policies might be driving our findings.
For brevity, we focus our discussion on the estimated coefficients in the last column –
our most complete specification. Some of the findings from Table 3 are expected, as is the
greater propensity to remit exhibited by undocumented immigrants previously noted in
the literature. Undocumented immigrants are 5.2 percentage points more likely to send
money home than their legal counterparts. A closer look at the impact of the two types of
immigration enforcement policies on migrants’ remitting patterns reveals a couple of find-
ings worth discussing. First, employment-based immigration enforcement measures (i.e.
E-Verify mandates) significantly lower undocumented migrants’ propensity to remit by 18
percentage points. Perhaps, employment restrictions curtail undocumented immigrants’
earning and remitting capabilities. Since undocumented immigrants account for approxi-
mately 64 percent of our sample, E-Verify mandates effectively reduce the remitting likeli-
hood of Mexican migrants by 9.4 percentage points.20
Second, unlike E-Verify mandates, police-based immigration enforcement measures (i.e.
287(g) agreements and Secure Communities) raise undocumented migrants’ propensity to
remit by 25 percentages points. This is likely to occur if, in the midst of increased uncer-
tainty surrounding their migration experience, undocumented migrants decide in larger
numbers to start remitting money home as an insurance mechanism. Furthermore, in
contrast to E-Verify mandates, police-based initiatives appear to significantly alter the re-
mitting likelihood of legal migrants, who become 26 percentage points less likely to send
money home. Perhaps, the deportation of undocumented family members that results
from the adoption of 287(g) agreements and Secure Communities –an unlikely outcome
of E-Verify, raises the financial burden of legal family members in the United States and
hinders their ability to remit. Taken altogether, 287(g) agreements and Secure Communi-
ties lower Mexican migrants’ remitting likelihood by 9.9 percentage points.21
Overall, then, the two sets of initiatives –police-based and employment-based immi-
gration enforcement measures– reduce the remitting likelihood of Mexican migrants
by approximately 19 percentage points (thus lowering the share of remitters from 66
percent to 47 percent). However, how are the two sets of policies impacting the dollar
amount sent home by remitters? While fewer migrants might find themselves in a pos-
ition to send money home, those able to do so might choose to remit larger amounts
to make up for lower remittance flows from undocumented household members in the
United States or to assist deported relatives back home.
To assess whether that is the case, we turn to the figures in Table 4. E-Verify man-
dates do not appear to have a statistically significant impact on the dollar amount sent
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Specifically, undocumented migrants reduce their remittance outflows by 34.7 percent
following the implementation of tougher enforcement. Perhaps, increased police-
enforcement induces undocumented migrants to go ‘into the shadows’ in an effort to
avoid apprehension –a move that could imply restricted driving, employment and, in
turn, earning and remitting capabilities. In contrast to their undocumented counter-
parts, legal migrants respond to the adoption of police-based initiatives by increasing
their remittance outflows by as much as 72.4 percent. Maybe, as hypothesized earlier,
legal migrants in a position to send money home remit larger amounts to support
deported family members back in Mexico, to ensure themselves against what appears to
be an increasingly more hostile environment in the United States, or to build up some sav-
ings with the purpose of going back to their home country in the future to join their rela-
tives. Regardless of their motives, tougher immigration enforcement increases the average
dollar amount sent home per Mexican remitter by 50 percent,22 raising their average
monthly remittance payments from $332/month to $498/month. While this might seem a
large amount, it is worth keeping in mind that this is the increase among remitters. Over-
all, however, the average dollar amount remitted per Mexican migrant rises by roughly
$20 following the adoption of tougher immigration enforcement policies.23
Summarizing, increased immigration enforcement impacts migrants’ remitting pat-
terns by curtailing their propensity to send money home. However, those continuing to
remit money home, increase the dollar amount sent. Perhaps, they do so as an insur-
ance mechanism in light of the increasingly hostile environment in the United States.
Alternatively, remitters might increase the dollar amount sent home for altruistic rea-
sons, such as to help deported family members and other relatives back home. Regard-
less of their motives, these policies overall raise the average dollar amount remitted by
migrants –reassuring us about the resilience of these money flows.
Finally, it is comforting to find that the figures in Tables 3 and 4 confirm well-known
findings in the literature, such as the fact that men are more likely to remit and remit lar-
ger sums than women. This is often the result when men are the main breadwinners in
their Mexican households. The remitting likelihood also rises with the migrant’s age, al-
though at a decreasing rate. Additionally, we find evidence that more educated migrants
are less likely to remit money home than their less educated counterparts. However, they
are able to remit somewhat larger amounts when they do so, possibly due to their better
employment and earnings outcomes in the United States. Indeed, higher monthly earnings
are positively linked to larger remittance flows. To conclude, there is some evidence of
how immigrants remit less as they become increasingly assimilated to the United States,
perhaps form new families and assume new responsibilities in the host country. For in-
stance, migrants’ propensity to remit declines with the length of their migration spell at
an increasing rate. Similarly, English proficient migrants and those engaged in social orga-
nizations –often byproduct of longer migration experiences and greater assimilation, are
less likely to remit and remit less if they send money to their families in Mexico.
7. Summary and conclusions
Remittances are, undoubtedly, a major source of income for many migrant sending
economies around the world. They are used for a multitude of purposes, from finan-
cing food, housing, education and health related expenses of family members back
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return, just to cite a few. While known for their resilience, these flows are likely to be
affected by host countries’ immigration policies that impact migrants’ employment and
earnings opportunities, as well as their likelihood of being apprehended and deported.
In this paper, we use data on Mexican migrants from the Mexican Migration Project
to examine how immigration enforcement policies implemented by the Department of
Homeland Security and by states after 9/11 are impacting migrants’ remitting patterns.
Specifically, we pay attention to two different sets of policies –one primarily targeting
the employment of unauthorized immigrants, as is the case with E-Verify mandates,
and the other one more broadly focused on police enforcement, as is the case with 287
(g) agreements and its successor: Secure Communities. In addition to their focus, these
policies differ with regards to their implementation levels. While E-Verify mandates are
state-level initiatives, the vast majority of 287(g) agreements are signed at the county
level –the same level at which the adherence to Secure Communities took place– with
the federal government, i.e. Immigration Customs and Enforcement (ICE).
We find that increased immigration enforcement impacts migrants’ remitting pat-
terns by severely restricting the share of undocumented immigrants sending money
home. However, not all policies are created equal. What we refer to as police-based ini-
tiatives, i.e. 287(g) agreements and Secure Communities, induce undocumented immi-
grants to start remitting money home, possibly as an insurance mechanism. However,
they significantly curtail legal migrants’ remitting likelihood, conceivably through the
greater financial responsibilities they now face following the deportation of family
members in mixed-status households. In contrast, E-Verify mandates, possibly through
their restrictions on undocumented migrants’ employment options, lower their propen-
sity to remit money home, but have no statistically significant impact on the remitting
likelihood of legal migrants. Overall, the two sets of policies curtail the propensity to
remit of Mexican migrants by approximately 19 percentage points.
We also find that remitters generally increase their money outflows following the adop-
tion of increased immigration enforcement. Specifically, although police-based initiatives
significantly lower the remittance outflows from undocumented migrants, they induce legal
migrants to increase their remittance payments. Why? Perhaps legal migrants try to make
up for their undocumented family members’ restricted ability to send money home. Alterna-
tively, they might be supporting deported family members back in Mexico, ensuring them-
selves against what appears to be an increasingly more hostile environment in the United
States, or building up some savings with the purpose of going back to their home country in
the future. Regardless of their motives, the dollar amount sent by remitters rises and, albeit
the lower share of migrants remitting home, tougher immigration enforcement raises the
average dollar amount remitted per Mexican migrant increases by roughly $20/month.
The fact that remittances increase with the implementation of stricter immigration
policies means that, in the midst of increased uncertainty about their migration experi-
ence or that of their undocumented family members, legal migrants boost their money
outflows so as to offset any reductions in remittance flows stemming from undocu-
mented immigrants’ restricted ability to work and save. This response safeguards remit-
tances as one of the least volatile sources of income in the developing world.
We believe these findings are of great importance given the currently debated com-
prehensive immigration reform proposal, which includes significant increases in
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ing proposal also attempts the implementation of a generalized amnesty –a policy that
could lower remittances as the motive for self- or family-provided insurance disappears
(Amuedo-Dorantes and Mazzolari 2010). Therefore, further research on what the combined
impact of the various policy components of the proposed comprehensive immigration re-
form might be on these vital money flows is crucial in order to forecast their impact and as-
sist in the drafting of viable development policies for migrant-sending countries.Endnotes
1The likelihood of migrating illegally from Mexico to the United States rises when
there are other family members already residing in the country, many of whom might
be legal (Massey et al. 2002).
2For instance, Cortés (2008) shows that the low-skilled immigration wave of the
1980-2000 resulted in an important reduction in the price of an agglomerate of non-
traded goods and services by a city average of 9-11 percent.
3Another state-level initiative we tried examining was omnibus immigration bills. Starting
with Arizona’s SB1070 in 2010, six states have enacted omnibus immigration legislation, in-
cluding Alabama (HB56), Georgia (HB87), Indiana (SB590), South Carolina (S20) and Utah
(Utah’s package – H116, H466, H469 and H497) in 2011. Their laws address a variety of
topics, from immigration enforcement by local and state police to verification for employ-
ment and public benefits. In some instances, they have gone even further, such as requiring
schools to verify students’ immigration status. Unfortunately, due to the recent nature of
these laws, we are unable to properly examine their impact with our data.
4See Table 5 in the Appendix for a listing of the states with E-Verify mandates, as well




6The three types refer to:
■ Task force model that permits local and state officers to question and arrest suspected
noncitizens during routine law enforcement operations.
■ Jail enforcement model, which enables local officers to question detained individuals
about their immigration status.
■ Hybrid models, which allow jurisdictions to participate in both types of programs. The
various types of programs can be implemented using a "targeted" or a "universal"
model. When implementing the program as a targeted model, local and state officers
focus on identifying serious criminal offenders, whereas the universal model
implementation focuses on processing as many undocumented immigrants as possible.
7United States v. Maricopa County, case number 2:12-cv-00981-LOA, filed May 10,
2012, available at: www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/46420125101544060757.pdf; DHS,
FY 2013 Budget in Brief, 16.
8ICE distinguishes between criminals in Priority 1, 2 and 3 based on the charge for
which they were arrested and their criminal history. Priority 1 being individuals
Amuedo-Dorantes and Puttitanun IZA Journal of Migration Page 19 of 262014, 3:6
http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/6convicted of an aggravated felony or multiple felonies, Priority 2 those with one felony
or three misdemeanors, and Priority 3 those with at least one misdemeanor.
9We are implicitly assuming that the vast majority of migrants impacted by these pol-
icies do not relocate to other counties or states. They either stay in their original loca-
tion or, if apprehended, they are deported to Mexico. In both instances, their incomes
fall to YL. There is emerging empirical evidence suggesting that, indeed, that is most
commonly the case (Amuedo-Dorantes and Lozano 2013, Watson 2013) in light of the
large number of deportations in the past years –averaging approximately 400,000/year.
Nevertheless, we also experiment with a theoretical extension that allows for the possi-
bility that migrants relocate to another U.S. locality not adopting tougher immigration
measures and, as such, are not adversely impacted by the policy. Comparative statics
are displayed in Appendix C. Our main predictions remain unchanged.
10Please refer to the appendix for the derivation of these conditions.
11Each household (and its members) is only interviewed once. Respondents are not
followed over time.
12For more detailed information on the survey design, please visit: http://mmp.opr.
princeton.edu/databases/dataoverview-en.aspx.
13For the purpose of the analysis, we label as treated those U.S. localities adopting
one of the policy measures being examined at some point in time, whereas control lo-
calities are those that do not.
14Because of the limited number of women in the MMP, dropping them from our sample
does not significantly alter our main findings. These results are available from the authors.
15Earnings and remittance data are deflated using the consumer price index from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics website (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/).
16 http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm.
17We also experiment with dropping those observations corresponding to migrants whose
last year in the United States coincides with the enactment year of the policy. Results (avail-
able from the authors) prove robust to that alternative definition of the policy variables.
18Our LM statistics is 1768.4, which is above 1 percent critical value of 29.92 by a
large margin.
19The least squares estimators are unbiased and consistent even when the assump-
tions of linearity, homoscedasticity and normality of the error term are violated.
20While legal migrants’ propensity to remit does not appear to significantly change
with the enactment of E-Verify mandates, the coefficients gauging the impact of E-
Verify mandates on legal and undocumented immigrants are jointly significant. As
such, the overall impact of E-Verify mandates on the likelihood of sending money
home by Mexican migrants is given by: (0.022-0.181*share of undocumented) = 0.022-
0.181*0.64 = -0.094.
21The overall impact of 287(g) agreements and Secure Communities on the likelihood
of sending money home by migrants is given by: (-0.26 + 0.251*share of undocu-
mented) = -0.26 + 0.251*0.64 = -0.099.
22The police-based initiatives, such as 287(g) agreements and Secure Communities,
increase the dollar amount remitted by Mexican migrants by 50 percent [(0.724-
0.347*0.64)*100] or an increase of $166.
23Before the adoption of these policies, 64.5 percent of migrants remitted an average
of $331/month. Hence, on average, the dollar amount remitted per migrant was:
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share of remitters drops to 47 percent, whereas the average dollar amount remitted
home by those sending money to their families increases by $166/month to approxi-
mately $498/month. Hence, on average, the dollar amount remitted per migrant in-
creases to $234/month = (0.47*$498).Appendix A
Table 5
Table 6Table 5 E-verify mandates
STATE MEASURE YEAR APPLIES TO
Colorado HB 1343 2006 State contractors
Arizona HB 2779 2007 employers, public and private
Oklahoma HB 1804 2007 Public employers, state contractors and subcontractors
Mississippi SB 2988 2008 employers, public and private
Missouri HB 1549 2008 Public employers, state contractors and subcontractors
Idaho Executive order 2009 State agencies
Nebraska LB 403 2009 Public employers, public contractors
Alabama HB 56 2011 Employers, public and private
Florida Executive order 2011 State agencies, state contractors and subcontractors
Indiana SB 590 2011 State agencies, state contractors
Louisiana HB 342, HB 646 2011 All employers (employers may look at photo IDs instead)
Minnesota Law 11-3590 2011 State contractors and subcontractors with contracts over
$50,000
Tennessee HB 1378 2011 Public employers and private employers with 6+ workers
(driver's licenses OK)
Pennsylvania SB 637 2012 Contractors and subcontractors on public works projects
(construction)
Georgia SB 529/HB 87 2006/2011 Public employers and private employers with more than
ten workers
North Carolina SB 1523/HB 36 2006/2011 State agencies, private employers with more than
24 workers
Utah SB 81/HB 116 2008/2010 Public employers, state contractors and subcontractors,
private employers with more than 14 workers
South Carolina HB 4400/SB 20 2008/2011 Employers, public and private
Virginia HB 737/HB 1859 2010/2011 State agencies, public contractors and subcontractors with
50+ employees and contracts over $50,000
Source: http://www.immigrationworksusa.org/index.php?p=110
Table 6 287(g) agreements
State Department Year Enforcement Type
Alabama Dept of Public Safety 2003/2012 Task Force
Etowah County Sheriff Office 2008 Jail Enforcement
Arizona Dept of Corrections 2005 Jail Enforcement
Maricopa County 2008 Hybrid
City of Mesa Police Department 2009 Jail Enforcement
City of Phoenix Police Department 2008/2012 Jail/Task Force
Florence Police Department 2009 Jail/Task Force
Table 6 287(g) agreements (Continued)
Pinal County Sheriff's Office 2008 Jail Enforcement
Pima County Sheriff's Office 2008 Jail/Task Force
Yavapai County Sheriff's Office 2008 Jail Enforcement
Dept of Public Safety 2007 Jail/Task Force
Arkansas Benton County Sheriff's Office 2007 Jail Enforcement
City of Springdale Police Department 2007 Task Force
Rogers Police Department 2007 Task Force
Washington County Sheriff's Office 2007 Jail Enforcement
Colorado Dept of Public Safety 2007 Task Force
El Paso County Sheriff's Office 2007 Jail Enforcement
California Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office 2005 Jail Enforcement
Orange County Sheriff's Office 2006 Jail Enforcement
Riverside County Sheriff's Office 2006 Jail Enforcement
San Bernardino County Sheriff's Office 2005 Jail Enforcement
Connecticut City of Danbury Police Department 2009 Task Force
Delaware Dept of Corrections 2009/2012 Jail Enforcement
Florida Dept of Law Enforcement 2002 Task Force
Collier County Sheriff's Office 2007 Jail Enforcement
Bay County Sheriff's Office 2008 Task Force
Jacksonville Sheriff's Office 2008 Jail Enforcement
Georgia Dept of Public Safety 2007 Task Force
Cobb County Sheriff's Office 2007 Jail Enforcement
Gwinnett County Sheriff's Office 2009 Jail Enforcement
Hail County Sheriff's Office 2008 Jail Enforcement
Whitfield County Sheriff's Office 2008 Jail Enforcement
Maryland Frederick County Sheriff's Office 2008 Jail Enforcement
Massachusetts Massachusetts Department of Correction 2007 Jail Enforcement
Minnesota Dept of Public Safety 2008/2012 Task Force
Missouri Missouri State Highway Patrol 2008/2012 Task Force
Nevada Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department 2008 Jail Enforcement
New Jersey Hudson County Department of Corrections 2008 Jail Enforcement
Monmouth County Sheriff's Office 2009 Jail Enforcement
New Mexico Dept of Corrections 2007 Jail Enforcement
North Carolina Alamance County Sheriff's Office 2007 Jail Enforcement
Cabarrus County Sheriff's Office 2007 Jail Enforcement
Gaston County Sheriff's Office 2007 Jail Enforcement
Mecklenburg County Sheriff's Office 2006 Jail Enforcement
Henderson County Sheriff's Office 2006 Jail Enforcement
City of Durham Police Department 2008 Task Force
Wake County Sheriff's Office 2008 Jail Enforcement
Ohio Butler County Sheriff's Office 2008 Jail Enforcement
Oklahoma Tulsa County Sheriff's Office 2007 Jail/Task Force
South Carolina Charleston County Sheriff's Office 2009 Jail Enforcement
Beaufort County Sheriff's Office 2008 Task Force
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Table 6 287(g) agreements (Continued)
Lexington County Sheriff's Office 2010 Jail Enforcement
York County Sheriff's Office 2007 Jail Enforcement
State Department Year Enforcement Type
Tennessee Davidson County Sheriff's Office 2007 Jail Enforcement
Tennessee Highway Patrol/Department of Safety 2008 Task Force
Texas Carrollton Police Department 2008 Jail Enforcement
Farmers Branch Police Department 2008 Task Force
Harris County Sheriff's Office 2008 Jail Enforcement
Utah Washington County Sheriff's Office 2008 Jail Enforcement
Weber County Sheriff's Office 2008 Jail Enforcement
Virginia Prince William-Manassas Regional Jail 2007 Jail Enforcement
Shenandoah County Sheriff's Office 2007 Jail Enforcement
Herndon Police Department 2007 Task Force
Rockingham County Sheriff's Office 2007 Jail Enforcement
Prince William County Police Department 2008 Task Force
Prince William County Sheriff's Office 2008 Task Force
Manassas Police Department 2008 Task Force
Manassas Park Police Department 2008 Task Force
Loudoun County Sheriff's Office 2008 Task Force
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where Equation (4) suggests that migrants’ consumption and their altruistic payments
over their lifetime are in keeping with the weights they assigned to their utility and the
probability that the good state prevails in period 2.















þ δω 1þ rð Þ
c2
¼ 0 ðB3Þ
From these conditions, we can derive some predictions regarding the change in a, zand x should the county or state where migrants reside adopt any of the immigration
enforcement measures being examined –that is, should the “poor” state of the world
prevail with probability Π. Specifically, using the implicit function theorem, we derive
the following comparative static results, which suggest that increases in the probability
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h i > 0 ðB5Þ
In other words, as the likelihood of being exposed to immigration enforcement mea-sures rises, migrants will save more and either invest or remit more for self- and
family-provided insurance purposes with the purpose of smoothing out their consump-
tion in the future. However, it is unclear how migrants’ remittances for altruistic
purposes will behave in response to a likelihood of being exposed to immigra-
tion enforcement measures; even though under relatively conservative assump
tion: c32 >
2a 1−Πð Þ YLþg xð Þþz 1þrð Þð Þ
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h i
− ωc21
− 1−ωð Þ 1þδ 1−Πð Þð Þa2 −
δω 1−Πð Þ2
c22
h i ≤or≥0 ðB6Þ
As such: ∂ aþzþxð Þ∂Π ≥ or ≤0.
Appendix C
Extension to the theoretical framework
In this section, we consider the possibility that migrants move between counties or
states in response to the adoption of stricter immigration enforcement measures in
their area of residence. Migrants will move only if their income at the new destination,
net of moving costs, is believed to be higher than if they stay. That is:
Migrants stay if : YL þ g xð Þ þ z 1þ rð Þ≥YH þ z 1þ rð Þ−a−M
Migrants move if : YL þ g xð Þ þ z 1þ rð Þ < YH þ z 1þ rð Þ−a−M
where M denotes moving costs. We further assume that migrants are able to improve
their net incomes by moving with probability (1- θ). Therefore, migrants now maximize
the below utility function:
U c1; c2; að Þ ¼ ω lnc1 þ 1−ωð Þ lna½  þ δ ω lnc2 þ 1−ωð ÞΠ 1−θð Þ lnaþ 1−ωð Þ 1−Πð Þ lna½ ;
where : 0≤ ω≤1; 0≤δ≤1; 0≤Π≤1; and0≤θ≤1
ðC1Þ
The weighing parameter: ω denotes the relative contributions to utility from the own
consumption of goods and services, versus the altruistic payments made to their family
members. The parameter: δ denotes a discount factor showing the relative tastes for
current (c1) versus future consumption (c2), while Π denotes the probability that the
counties/states where migrants reside adopt one of the immigration enforcement mea-
sures being examined. The parameter: θ denotes the probability that migrants stay in
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Consumption in period 1 is still constrained by migrants’ income, the amount sent
for family-provided insurance (x), their investments/self-insurance (z), and the level of
altruistic payments they make to their families back home (a) as follow:
c1≤YH−x−z−a ðC2Þ
In period 2, some of the migrants residing in localities subject to increased immigra-tion enforcement might not be able to increase their net incomes by relocating –an
event that might occur with probability: θ. In those instances, their net income will be
given by: YL + g(x) + z(1 + r). However, other migrants might be able to improve their
incomes by relocating –an event we assume might occur with probability (1 – θ).
Those migrants might then still afford to remit a for altruistic purposes, and since they
will not need any family-provided insurance: g(x), their net income will be given by: YH
+ z(1 + r) − a −M. Therefore, consumption in period 2 will be given by:
c2≤Π θ YL þ g xð Þ þ z 1þ rð Þð Þ þ 1−θð Þ YH þ z 1þ rð Þ−a−M½ ð Þ þ 1−Πð Þ YH þ z 1þ rð Þ−að Þ
ðC3Þ
Migrants will choose the level of altruistic payments, a, the amount of family-providedinsurance, x, and the level of self-insurance/investment or saving, z, so as to maximize the
utility function described in (C1) subject to the budget constraints in equations (C2)-(C3).

























þ δω 1þ rð Þ
c2
¼ 0 ðC6Þ
From conditions (C4)-(C6), we can derive predictions regarding the change in a, zand x should the county or state where migrants reside adopt any of the immigration
enforcement measures at hand –that is, should the “poor” state of the world prevail
with probability: Π. Using the implicit function theorem, the derived comparative stat-
ics suggest that increases in Π lead to an increase in family-provided insurance pre-
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In other words, as the likelihood of being exposed to immigration enforcement mea-sures rises, migrants will save more and either invest or remit more for self- and
family-provided insurance purposes with the purpose of smoothing out their
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tic purposes will behave in response to an increase in the likelihood of being exposed
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Therefore, from a theoretical point of view, remittances could increase, decrease or
stay the same following an increase in immigration enforcement, that is: ∂ aþzþxð Þ∂Π ≥or≤0.
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